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The argument that a crisis in Russian-Chinese relations is unavoidable has been repeatedly 
referred to by analysts since the 1990s. The reason for this crisis would be geopolitical com-
petition between the two powers in Central Asia. In 2013, China’s President Xi Jinping anno-
unced the concept of the New Silk Road (referred to by the Chinese side as ‘One Belt, One 
Road’). At the same time, Moscow announced its efforts to build its own integration project 
in the form of the Eurasian Economic Union. These two developments seemed to confirm that 
the initial argument was correct and that the two projects were apparently fated to compete. 
Meanwhile, in May 2015, during President Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow, a joint declaration was 
issued calling for combining the two projects and creating a formal mechanism for their co-
ordination in the form of a joint task force. The vision of “a great Eurasian partnership” anno-
unced by President Vladimir Putin during the International Economic Forum in St. Petersburg 
on 16–17 June 2016 – which he also referred to as the Greater Eurasia project – is a signal that 
Moscow has ultimately opted for the strategy of joining a stronger partner (bandwagoning) 
instead of choosing the strategy of counterbalancing the rising power of China. At the same 
time, Moscow is trying to conceal the growing asymmetry in Russian-Chinese relations. 
The New Silk Road:  
the Chinese vision for Eurasia 
The Chinese concept of the New Silk Road, which 
was presented for the first time by President 
Xi Jinping in the autumn of 2013, provides for 
a construction of infrastructural connections be-
tween China and Europe, mainly in China’s ne-
ighbourhood. Specific components of the New 
Silk Road include: Central Asia (in the form of 
the Silk Road Economic Belt), South-Eastern and 
Southern Asia (in the form of the 21st century 
Maritime Silk Road) and Pakistan (in the form 
of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor). The 
Chinese initiative also includes transit countries 
and regions on the way to Europe, i.e. Russia, 
Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the 
South Caucasus, Turkey and the Middle East 
region. More than 60 states have declared the-
ir participation in the project. The new concept 
is the outcome of the rising material potential 
of China, which has become evident especially 
after the global economic crisis in 2008–2009, 
of the growing confidence of Chinese elites and 
of the search by China’s leader Xi Jinping for 
a unique formula for Chinese foreign policy.
The New Silk Road reflects the Chinese vision 
of the organisation of relationships in Eura-
sia as broadly understood. The most impor-
tant elements of this vision include: openness 
to potential participants, efforts to limit po-
tential trade barriers and neutralise closed re-
gional economic cooperation formats, as well 
as attempts to devise an economic and de-
velopment cooperation formula with smaller 
states which would be an alternative to the 
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American concept. At the same time, using 
the initiatives carried out under the New Silk 
Road, China is striving to exert durable influ-
ence on states located in its neighbourhood. 
This type of influence should be independent 
of potential domestic changes in these states.
The New Silk Road remains a very broad con-
cept, with a framework which has been insti-
tutionalised to only a small degree. So far, only 
mechanisms for funding the New Silk Road have 
been created. A unilateral (i.e. Chinese-only) 
New Silk Road Fund has been established, and 
a multilateral Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB) created as an additional tool to fund 
projects under the New Silk Road initiative. As 
a consequence, it can be expected that the New 
Silk Road will serve the purposes of public di-
plomacy and create the impression that Chinese 
policy is multilateral. However, a major portion 
of China’s activity will continue to be carried 
out within a flexible formula of bilateral rela-
tions. Under the initiative of building the New 
Silk Road, China is carrying out several invest-
ment projects, mainly in the field of transport 
infrastructure (railways in Central Asian states, 
seaports in South-East Asia) and energy infra-
structure (power plants in Pakistan). Over the 
last three years, most loans granted by Chinese 
state-controlled banks have been allocated to 
participants in the New Silk Road project.
This formula of the New Silk Road reflects the 
functional understanding by Chinese elites of 
the question of influence. From Beijing’s per-
spective, the initiative is intended to facilitate 
economic expansion and help keep external 
markets open to Chinese trade and investments. 
It is also expected to help bypass certain re-
gional initiatives such as the Russian-controlled 
Eurasian Economic Union, which could form 
a barrier to the Chinese economy, for example 
by establishing a customs union. In addition, 
this approach is a method of ‘concealing’ Chi-
na’s economic expansion and presenting it as 
a form of multilateralism and self-limiting of po-
litical ambitions which potential partners could 
view as excessive. At the same time, the New 
Silk Road remains a unilateral initiative, which 
so far has been shaped by the Chinese side, in 
contrast to initial announcements. Moreover, 
Beijing is showing no particular readiness to 
define the rules governing the New Silk Road’s 
activities more clearly. Instead, it limits itself to 
issuing vague statements in which it refers to 
“mutually beneficial (win-win) cooperation”.
The vague nature of the principles on which 
the Chinese concept is based seems to suggest 
that Beijing is only slightly interested in offi-
cial announcements by those states involved in 
the project, in which they declared that they 
would accept China’s leading role in the initi-
ative. Real economic benefits seem to matter 
much more. These mainly include maintaining 
the openness of external markets to China’s 
economic expansion and enabling the export 
of production surplus and excess capital. For 
Beijing, the form in which its influence is exert-
ed seems to be much less important that the 
content of such influence.
Russia’s response: Greater Eurasia
Russia has interpreted the launch of the New 
Silk Road project as a declaration that Chi-
na is intensifying its economic penetration 
of Central Asia1. Since at least the end of the 
1990s, Moscow has been observing China’s 
rising economic influence in this region with 
concern. There were fears that Beijing might 
1 For more on China’s economic penetration of Central Asia, 
see Aleksandra Jarosiewicz, Krzysztof Strachota, ‘China vs. 
Central Asia. The achievements of the past two decades’, 
OSW Studies no. 45 (2013), especially chart 1, p. 57.
The aim of the New Silk Road project is to 
facilitate China’s economic expansion and 
to maintain the openness of external mar-
kets to Chinese trade and investments.
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want to use this influence to challenge Rus-
sia’s status as a regional hegemon. Russia’s 
economic integration projects, which it has 
been dynamically implementing since 2011 
(the Customs Union, the Common Econom-
ic Space, the Eurasian Economic Union), were 
intended to stop this trend, among other 
things. This is why initially Moscow was re-
luctant to accept the new Chinese initiative2. 
However, at a summit in Shanghai in May 2014, 
Russia and China issued a joint statement in 
which they declared their readiness to launch 
talks on synchronising their economic coop-
eration projects: the Eurasian Economic Un-
ion (EaEU) and the New Silk Road. At the 2015 
summit a separate declaration on cooperation 
between the two initiatives was adopted. Dur-
ing this year’s International Economic Forum 
in St. Petersburg (16–17 June), at the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation summit in Tashkent 
(24 June) and during his visit to China (25 June), 
President Vladimir Putin proposed a new vision 
of economic cooperation in Eurasia: a “great 
Eurasian partnership” which he also referred to 
as “Greater Eurasia”. It would involve the crea-
tion of a network of bi- and multilateral trade 
agreements between the Eurasian Economic 
Union, China, member states of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation and ASEAN, as well 
as the European Union. Initially, these agree-
ments would involve the simplification and uni-
fication of regulations regarding cooperation 
in specific areas and in investments, as well as 
of technical, phytosanitary and customs regu-
lations and regulations concerning intellectual 
property. Later, the agreements would involve 
2 See Rossiysko-kitayskiy dialog: model 2016 (ed.) I.S. Iva-
nov, (Doklad RSMD, #25/2016), p. 41-42.
the lowering of tariffs, and ultimately the crea-
tion of a free trade zone3.
Above all, the new project is intended to create 
the impression that it is Moscow that is taking 
the initiative in Russian-Chinese relations, and 
thereby to conceal and legitimise the growing 
asymmetry in bilateral relations. Secondly, the 
idea of Greater Eurasia – similar to the previ-
ous idea of ‘Greater Europe’4 – is intended to be 
a propaganda instrument to persuade Western 
Europe to develop cooperation with Russia on 
Russia’s terms.
The origin of the project
The Greater Eurasia project was devised at 
a point when the Kremlin began to face fun-
damental challenges. Some of these challeng-
es (including the halt of Russia’s economic 
growth) came as a consequence of the global 
economic slowdown and the lack of domes-
tic reforms. However, other challenges result-
ed from Russia’s revisionist policy towards the 
West which it has pursued at least since 2007 
(the significant speech by President Putin at 
the Munich security conference). Russia’s at-
tempt to expand the Eurasian project to include 
Ukraine, made as part of this policy, has led to 
a confrontation with the United States and with 
the European Union, and ultimately caused 
a limitation of Russia’s access to Western loans 
and technologies. At the same time, the rising 
economic power of China has lead to an asym-
metry in Moscow’s relations with Beijing, which 
began to become increasingly evident in 2015. 
3 http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50864; 
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52178\
4 The concept of ‘Greater Europe’ was proposed by Pres-
ident Boris Yeltsin in 1996 and continued by President 
Vladimir Putin. It involved the creation of a geopolitical 
Russia–Europe bloc composed of two elements: the Eu-
ropean Union and the bloc of Eastern European states 
dominated by Russia. The concept of Greater Europe 
also provided for the breaking of trans-Atlantic ties and 
creating a ‘complementary’ partnership between Russia 
and Europe, to enable Russia to gain access to Western 
European capital and technologies without the need 
to adopt European standards. See Marek Menkiszak, 
Greater Europe. Putin’s Vision of European (Dis)integra-
tion, OSW Studies, no. 46, 2013.
The Greater Eurasia project is intended to 
conceal and legitimise the growing asym-
metry in Russian-Chinese relations.
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Despite the Kremlin’s disappointment at the 
insufficient scope of China’s economic assis-
tance offered to Russia when the latter became 
detached from Western financial markets due 
to its confrontation with its geopolitical oppo-
nent, Moscow was forced to make a series of 
major concessions. These included the export 
to China of armaments systems of a higher lev-
el of advancement than before, which poten-
tially could change the balance of power in the 
Pacific region (S-400 air defence systems and 
Su-35 fighter jets); the opening of the Russian 
market to Chinese investments, including al-
lowing Chinese companies to operate in the 
energy sector as co-owners of deposits5, and 
indirect support for the Chinese stance in the 
territorial dispute over the South China Sea6.
The intellectual background of the Greater Eur-
asia project was formulated by a group of ex-
perts working, most probably on commission 
from the Russian government, under the aegis 
of the Valdai Club. The group’s work was pre-
sided over by Sergei Karaganov and Timofey 
Bordachev. In a report prepared in April 2015, 
5 The process by which Chinese companies entered the Rus-
sian energy sector was rather lengthy. For example, in Jan-
uary 2014 the Chinese state-controlled company CNPC pur-
chased 20% of shares in the Yamal LNG gas project, and in 
March 2016 it purchased an additional 9.9% of the shares. 
In December 2015, the Chinese company Sinopec purchased 
a 10% stock package in the Russian petrochemical company 
Sibur. In June 2016, the Russian regulator approved the sale 
of a 13.3% stock package in the company Norilskyi Nikel to 
Chinese investors. 
6 See the statement by Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei 
Lavrov on 12 April 2016; http://www.mid.ru/press_ser-
vice/minister_speeches/-/asset_publisher/7OvQR5K-
JWVmR/content/id/2227965; and the joint declaration 
by the leaders of China and Russia (25 June 2016) http://
kremlin.ru/supplement/5100. 
entitled “Towards the great Ocean – 3. The cre-
ation of Central Eurasia”7, they called for “the 
transformation of Central Eurasia into a zone of 
joint development” by combining the Chinese 
New Silk Road initiative with the Russian pro-
ject of Eurasian economic integration. The goal 
would be to avoid geopolitical rivalry between 
the two projects and to create a mechanism 
fostering Russian-Chinese interaction in Central 
Asia according to the rules of a “non-zero sum 
game”. This type of interaction should be based 
on the shared interest of Moscow and Beijing 
in stabilising the Central Asian states and elim-
inating “political interference by non-regional 
[read: American] forces”. The core of this struc-
ture should be the common creation of a trans-
port infrastructure connecting China with Eu-
ropean markets via Central Asia and Russia. The 
report contained a proposal for the states in-
volved in the project to create a joint “high-lev-
el committee” on cooperation in the develop-
ment of transport-logistics corridors and the 
implementation of development projects. The 
report contained recommendations regarding 
the launch of a ‘Central Eurasia Dialogue’ be-
tween the EaEU, China and the remaining states 
of the region to serve as a political umbrella 
protecting the project. In the further perspec-
tive, the authors of the report proposed “the 
creation of a community (or a union) of cooper-
ation, stable growth and security for the whole 
of Eurasia, which would stretch not only to the 





8 See K velikomu Okeanu - 3. Sozdaniye Tsentralnoy Yevrazii. 
Analiticheskiy doklad Mezhdunarodnogo Diskussionogo 
kluba “Valdai” (kratkaya versiya), p. 4, 12, 13, 20, 21. The 
report did not mention the term Greater Eurasia. It was used 
for the first time by Sergei Karaganov in the interview “Ki-
tayskii veter duyet v nashy parusa” in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 
1 June 2016. In autumn 2015 it began to be used by Pu-
tin’s close associates, for example Sergei Naryshkin and 
Igor Sechin, see W. Petrov, Bolshaya Yevraziya, Rossiyskaya 
Gazeta, 7 October 2015, M. Melnikov, Rosneft’ mechtayet 
sogret’ Yevropu v obyatiyakh, Russkaya Planeta, 23 October 
2015, http://rusplt.ru/world/rosneft-mechtaet-sogret-evro-
pu-v-obyyatiyah-19376.html
Focused on building economic influence, 
Beijing’s policy limits the potential rival-
ry between Russia and China, and paves 
the way for harmonising the projects that 
both powers have devised for Eurasia.
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An escape into the future
The new vision of geo-economic order pro-
posed by the Kremlin is mainly intended to cre-
ate the impression, albeit false, that Russia is 
the initiator of the new economic order which 
is emerging in Eurasia and that, due to its role 
as an essential intermediary in contacts with 
Asian markets, it can impose certain conditions 
of mutual cooperation on the European Union. 
At the same time, it serves as an ideological 
screen intended to conceal the Kremlin’s ac-
ceptance of the growing asymmetry in Russia’s 
relations with China. This asymmetry is becom-
ing evident in both the economic and the polit-
ical sphere. In a more practical dimension, the 
rhetoric of the Greater Eurasia concept is in-
tended to conceal Moscow’s de facto abandon-
ment of its attempts to block China’s economic 
expansion in Central Asia and Russia’s consent 
to a condominium in the region.
Several fundamental assumptions which the 
Russian authorities (and President Putin him-
self) apply in their policy towards China pro-
vide an important background for the project 
devised by the Kremlin. Firstly, Russia cannot 
afford to become involved in an open conflict 
with China, because the cost of such a conflict 
would be immense. Secondly, for Russia the 
policy pursued by Washington poses a greater 
threat than the policy pursued by Beijing, and 
a possible Pax Sinica would be more suitable for 
Russia than a Pax Americana. From the point 
of view of the authorities in the Kremlin, the 
most important point is that, unlike Washing-
ton, Beijing does not intend to change the sys-
tem of governance in Russia by way of a ‘col-
our revolution’ (of which the Kremlin has long 
suspected Washington). Moreover, Beijing has 
demonstrated its readiness to work out a ge-
opolitical compromise in Central Asia, which 
would require China to combine its dominance 
in the sphere of the economy with respect for 
Russia’s interests in the sphere of politics and 
security. Experts associated with the Kremlin 
seem to believe that the Chinese political tradi-
tion – unlike the Western one – “does not pro-
vide for expansion with the use of force and for 
basing [its foreign policy – WR] on hard pow-
er”9. These assumptions exclude the policy of 
geopolitical balancing in Russia’s relations with 
China, although they do not exclude efforts to 
strengthen Russia’s position versus China by 
way of diversifying the economic ties.
The project’s target recipients
Beijing is the first target recipient of the Greater 
Eurasia project. The sense of Putin’s offer to Bei-
jing seems to be Russia’s consent to cooperation 
with China in the implementation of Beijing’s 
strategy involving economic expansion west-
ward, albeit only on condition that China takes 
Russian interests into account. These interests 
mainly include maintaining the institutional co-
herence of the Eurasian project and postponing 
the question of liberalisation of trade in goods. 
The Russian offer also includes tacit approval 
for a Russian-Chinese condominium in Central 
Asia, which involves Russia’s dominance in the 
sphere of politics and security and China’s dom-
inance in the sphere of the economy.
9 Strategiya dlya Rossiyi. Rossiyskaya vneshnaya politika: 
konets 2010-kh-nachalo 2020-kh godov (2016), p. 4. 
A policy document prepared under the supervision of 
Sergei Karaganov by a team of experts and diplomats 
similar to the one which prepared the report “K veli-
komu Okeanu”. There are many more similar quotes. For 
example, the text prepared in 2010 under the supervi-
sion of another key expert associated with the Kremlin, 
Vyacheslav Nikonov, directly states: “It should howev-
er be understood that direct diktat and dominance are 
absent from the Chinese tradition”; Tikhookenskaya 
strategiya Rossii, p. 6. It is difficult to say whether these 
assessments are manifestations of ‘wishful thinking’ or 
‘putting a brave face’.
The concept of Greater Eurasia is a propa-
ganda tool intended to persuade Western 
Europe to develop cooperation with Rus-
sia on Moscow’s conditions.
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Other target recipients of the project are the 
key EU states, mainly Germany, France and It-
aly. In this case, the vision of Greater Eurasia is 
to serve the same purpose which Moscow in-
tended to achieve when promoting the Greater 
Europe project. This purpose involved Russia’s 
‘temptation’ of Western Europe with the pros-
pect of economic cooperation with the East and 
peaceful coexistence with Russia, which will ul-
timately lead to Western Europe’s ‘emancipa-
tion’ from the American strategic umbrella and 
the West’s consent to asymmetric economic 
cooperation on Russia’s terms. The vision of the 
Russian market, or even the post-Soviet mar-
ket, proved insufficiently attractive to convince 
Western Europe to strike a geopolitical deal. 
Therefore, Putin is now trying to achieve the 
same result by presenting the Europeans 
with a vision of Asian markets and suggest-
ing that they could significantly increase their 
presence on these markets if they cooperat-
ed with Russia. On the other hand, this offer 
contains elements of blackmail which threat-
ens Europe with economic and political mar-
ginalisation, should Europe decide not to take 
advantage of the benefits of Russian ‘media-
tion’. From Russia’s perspective, the offer it 
extended to Western Europe is an attempt to 
avoid Moscow’s excessive economic depend-
ence on China10.
Other target recipients of Putin’s project are 
Asian states, as potential participants in the 
economic ‘cooperation network’. The implied 
10 The authors of the concept of Greater Eurasia directly 
state: “[Russia’s] economic turn eastwards… is not tan-
tamount to Russia turning its back on Europe in eco-
nomic terms or swapping its unilateral dependence on 
European markets for an equally unilateral dependence 
on China”. K velikomu Okeanu - 3., p. 4.
sense of Putin’s offer is to invite Asian partners 
– India, Iran, ASEAN, South Korea – to join the 
Russian strategy of making an ever-stronger 
China an element of an increasingly complex 
network of multilateral economic and political 
institutions which will limit Beijing’s potential 
to use its advantage in bilateral relations.
The consequences for Russian-Chinese 
relations
Unlike Russia’s Greater Eurasia project, China’s 
New Silk Road is a manifestation of a drive to-
wards globalisation, rather than the regional-
isation of international politics. This approach 
has several consequences for Chinese-Russian 
relations. Firstly, China treats Russia, and po-
tentially also the Eurasian Economic Union, 
as one of the corridors of the New Silk Road, 
one which offers the shortest route while at 
the same time being a unified customs area. 
Secondly, China aims to prevent the EaEU 
from becoming a barrier to China’s economic 
presence in the post-Soviet area. This would 
be likely if the customs union provided for in 
the EaEU treaty were implemented and specif-
ic economic policies were grouped under one 
coordination mechanism. At the same time, 
China does not, at least for the time being, in-
tend to assume political leadership in Eurasia 
and is ready to share the responsibility with 
other actors (except for the United States). 
This policy as pursued by Beijing limits the 
potential rivalry between Russia and China in 
the post-Soviet area, and paves the way for 
harmonising the projects that both China and 
Russia have devised for Eurasia. 
The Russian vision of Greater Eurasia is not an 
attempt to block the Chinese New Silk Road 
project. On the contrary, the Russian project 
represents indirect consent to the Chinese vi-
sion of economic cooperation in Eurasia, one 
in which specific economic blocs do not pursue 
a protectionist and limited policy. At the same 
time, this vision enables the Kremlin to main-
Moscow chose to adapt to China’s grow-
ing influence in Central Asia rather than 
counterbalance it.
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tain an appearance that it retains the political 
initiative in its neighbourhood and is shaping 
the policy together with Beijing.
For Beijing, the future framework of China’s co-
operation with the EaEU is not a matter of key 
importance. The EaEU’s potential is not signif-
icant enough to make the lack of a free trade 
zone (which is what China officially supports) 
a barrier to cooperation. Similarly, it should not 
be expected that China will strive to make the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation the main 
forum for coordinating cooperation between 
the New Silk Road and the EaEU, due to China’s 
reluctant approach towards institutionalisation 
and the weak results of the economic coopera-
tion achieved so far within this format.
